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CHAPTER 2 
Armageddon or Adolescence? 
Making Sense of Microfinance’s Recent Travails 
David Roodman* 
Abstract 
The pendulum of public perception is swinging against microfinance. That leaves 
the thoughtful observer, wary of extreme claims in any direction, with a puzzle. Is 
microfinance a bane or a boon or in between? This paper reviews the triumphs and 
troubles of the microfinance industry. It then sets forth a frame for assessing the 
impact of microfinance, one that helps put the recent challenges in perspective. 
And it offers some thoughts, in light of these difficulties, about key tasks going 
forward. It concludes that microcredit stimulates small-scale business activity, but 
that the best available evidence fails to show it reducing poverty. Its ability to em-
power people, especially women, is also ambiguous. Still, there is no question that 
all people need financial services. The main achievement of the microfinance 
movement has been the founding of businesses and businesslike non-profits that 
are delivering these services to millions of people on a sustainable basis. 
The core problem facing the industry is that just as a stable banking system is 
more than a bunch of banks, a microfinance industry is more likely to be safe and 
resilient if it contains not just microfinance institutions, but credit bureaus, consumer 
protection laws, effective regulators, and more; and many of these other institutions 
are weak or absent in poor nations. It is hard (though not impossible) for donors and 
social investors to improve them. Yet the stronger they are, the higher is the safe 
speed limit for growth of microfinance institutions. The weaker they are, the more 
that microfinance institutions will need to internalize limits on their behavior and 
growth. Key steps may include giving those with an institutional commitment to the 
“social bottom line,” such as representatives of non-governmental organizations, 
public agencies or social investors, a formal role in microfinance institution govern-
ance; creating systems for defining and enforcing responsible lending behavior; and 
building collective arrangements such as an international credit bureau to monitor 
and modulate aggregate investment flows into microfinance markets. 
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1 Introduction 
Speaking in India just after the government of Andhra Pradesh had ambushed the 
microcredit industry amid reports of suicide, Sam Daley-Harris observed that the 
movement he had done so much to build was undergoing a “near-death experi-
ence.” Indeed, recent years have delivered harsh shocks to the global microfinance 
industry and to the broader movement that incubated and supports it. Microcredit 
bubbles have inflated and popped. “Successful” initial public offerings (IPOs) 
have sparked heartfelt debates about the proper balance between price and profit. 
Star academics have found the impact of microcredit on poverty to be merely neu-
tral. New works in print and film have accused microcredit of impacts far worse 
than neutral, portraying the microfinance investment industry as morally corrupt. 
Clearly the pendulum of public perception is swinging against microfinance. 
That leaves the thoughtful observer, wary of extreme claims in any direction, with 
a puzzle. Is microfinance a bane or a boon or in between? 
There were good reasons why in 2006 the Nobel Committee awarded a peace 
prize to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, with its millions of female 
owner-clients. Not for nothing did the United Nations declare 2005 the Year of 
Microcredit. For by then, the microfinance industry had stood up robust financial 
institutions delivering useful financial services to millions of deserving women 
and men who otherwise lacked access to such services. It had demonstrated that 
outsiders could help these institutions become financially self-sufficient. And as 
the industries have matured they have generally cut prices and diversified their 
offerings, in particular moving into savings. This success in building whole indus-
tries is rare in the annals of foreign aid and philanthropy. Meanwhile, a distinct 
industry has developed to channel at least a billion dollars per year of private in-
vestment into microfinance.1 This investment helped finance an expansion from 
some 11 million microcredit borrowers worldwide in 2000 to 94 million in 2010.2 
This paper reviews the triumphs and troubles of the microfinance industry. It 
then sets forth a frame for assessing the impact of microfinance, one that helps put 
the recent challenges in perspective. And it offer some thoughts, in light of these 
difficulties, about key tasks going forward. 
Overall, microcredit does stimulate small-scale business activity, but going by 
the best available evidence, it does not reliably reduce poverty. Its ability to em-
power people, especially women, is also ambiguous since while it can give women 
more economic power, in some cases it has burdened them with the fear of default 
and loss of face in public group setting. Nevertheless, just as mainstream finance 
is essential despite its shortcomings, so are micro-financial services inherently 
                                                          
1 Figure is net new commitments from individual and institutional investors based on 
author’s analysis of CGAP Cross-Border Funding Surveys (Roodman 2012, p. 241). 
2 Author’s calculations, based on data downloaded August 22, 2012. Figures exclude some 
large institutions that are heavily subsidized or up-market on the credit side: Banco Caja 
Social Colombia, Banco Popular do Brasil, Kenya Post Office Savings Bank, Khushhali 
Bank of Pakistan, Postal Savings Bank of China, and Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. 
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valuable even when they do not help every client they touch. The greatest 
achievement of the microfinance movement has been the founding of businesses 
and businesslike non-profits that are delivering these inherently useful services to 
millions of people on a sustainable basis. 
In this view, the greatest concern arising out of the recent travails is that in 
some places the industry has strayed from this core strength primarily by growing 
too fast. The result in some countries has been a collective eagerness to lend that 
has made microcredit less safe, and led to bubbles and political backlashes that 
damaged or destroyed microfinance institutions. 
The core problem facing the industry is that just as a stable banking system is 
more than a bunch of banks, a microfinance industry is more likely to be safe and 
resilient if it contains not just microfinance institutions, but credit bureaus, con-
sumer protection laws, effective regulators, and more. Many of these other institu-
tions are weak or absent in poor nations (not to mention many rich nations). And it 
is not easy for donors and social investors to improve them. The stronger they are, 
the higher is the safe speed limit for growth of microfinance institutions. The 
weaker they are, the more that microfinance institutions will need to internalize 
limits on their behavior and growth. 
2 The Triumphs 
Since 2000, microfinance has expanded remarkably. Going by data from the Mi-
crofinance Information Exchange (MIX), total outstanding microloans rose from 
$2.2 billion in 2000 to $80 billion in 2011, a 37-fold increase overall, and equivalent 
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Fig. 1. Billions in Outstanding Microloans by Region, 2000–11  
Source: MIX 
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America, Eastern Europe, and East Asia—accounted for most of this expansion 
because on average people there can absorb larger loans. 
The trends in the total number of loans, rather than the total value, differ in a 
few ways, primarily because South Asia, where loans are small but numerous, 
moves to the fore. Worldwide, the tally climbed from 10.8 million in 2000 to 95 
million in 2010, but then dropped to 81 million in 2011 because of the near shut-
down of the industry in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.3 (See Fig. 2. Section 3 
describes that event.) Less evident from the graph is the shrinkage in the Middle 
East and North Africa from 2.2 million to 1.5 million borrowers, which was driven 
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Fig. 2. Millions of outstanding microloans, 2000–11 
Source: MIX 
The arrival of microcredit as a major business can be measured in other ways. 
Half of outstanding microloans at the end of 2011 were made by microfinance in-
stitutions (MFIs) reporting operating expenses below 14 % of the loan stock. (See 
Fig. 3, which plots the distribution of outstanding microloans by lender’s expense 
ratio.4) Fourteen percent exceeds levels typically found in conventional retail 
credit, but is lean given the administrative challenges of lending in small quanta to 
people operating in the informal economy. 
                                                          
3 These and subsequent graphs exclude some large institutions that are heavily subsidized 
or up-market on the credit side: Banco Caja Social Colombia, Banco Popular do Brasil, 
Kenya Post Office Savings Bank, Khushhali Bank of Pakistan, Postal Savings Bank of 
China, and Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. 
4 This and subsequent graphs omit the Grameen Bank for lack of data and BRAC for lack 
of reliable data. For clarity, these graphs also omit a small number of institutions out-
side the plotted ranges. 









0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Millions of loans
Operating expenses/loan portfolio  









0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Millions of loans
Portfolio at risk at least 30 days  
Fig. 4. Number of outstanding loans by Portfolio at Risk more than 30 days, 2011 
Source: MIX 
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Outside of India, portfolio quality is generally high too. The share of outstanding 
credits on which payments are at least 30 days late (portfolio at risk, 30 days, or 
PAR 30) is generally low: half of all outstanding microloans at end-2011 were 
from MFIs with a PAR30 below 4 % and three-quarters were from lenders below 
10 %. (See Fig. 4.) The major exception is Andhra Pradesh, where Spandana, 
Share, and AML carried large stocks of delinquent loans on their books. (As a 
publicly traded company, SKS is subject to stricter accounting rules, and had al-
ready written off most of its Andhra Pradesh delinquencies). 
The prevalence of efficiency helps explain why most microloans come from 
MFIs with positive profit margins (net operating income as a share of financial 
revenue; see Fig. 5). For most, weighting by number of loans, the profit margin 


















Profit margin  
Fig. 5. Number of outstanding loans by profit Margin of MFI, 2011 
Source: MIX 
The story is similar if one examines return on assets (ROA; Fig. 6) or return on 
equity (ROE; Fig. 7). Many major MFIs make 4 % ROA or more, which is im-
pressive by banking industry standards. The outliers on the negative end include 
the Andhra Pradesh MFIs, especially SKS because of large write-offs. High-ROE 
MFIs include Compartamos in Mexico at 34 %, and India’s Bandhan at 38 %. 
These figures overestimate the self-sufficiency of MFIs that obtain debt financ-
ing on favorable terms from socially motivated investors. Forced to operate on the 
same playing field as other firms of similar size and risk, their expenses would be  
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Fig. 7. Number of outstanding loans by return on equity (ROE) of MFI, 2011 
Source: MIX 
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higher and profits lower. That said, while the extent of the overestimate is hard to 
know, it is unlikely to fundamentally change the picture of the microfinance industry 
as operating under its own power. Financing costs are only about a quarter of operat-
ing costs for individual lenders, and about a sixth for the group lenders that serve 
most microcredit clients. If withdrawal of grants and concessional investment ele-
ments doubled financing costs that would increase total costs by one-fourth to one-
sixth.5 Some of this cost increase could be offset by increases in efficiency or inter-
est rates. Thus it seems likely that the majority of microfinance clients are served by 
institutions that are self-sufficient or within striking distance of being so. 
The microfinance investment industry has grown too. The first dedicated mi-
crofinance investment vehicle (MIV) was Profund: founded in 1995, it focused on 
Latin America and turned a profit over its ten-year life. By 2000, 15 MIVs oper-
ated; by 2010, 101 did (Symbiotics 2012a, see Fig. 8). However, three MIVs 
closed in 2010 and another nine followed in 2010, so that the total number of ac-
tive MIVs fell on net in 2011, to 99.) While MIVs have invested predominantly in 
debt (more than 80 % of their funding; Symbiotics 2012a), microfinance securities 
have become more variegated: there are direct loans, tradable bonds, equity, col-
lateralized debt obligations, and more. Creativity in finance of course has its pit-
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Fig. 8. Number of microfinance investment vehicles, 2000–11  
Source: Symbiotics 
                                                          
5 Cost figures from Roodman (2012, Table 5–2), which is based on MIX (2010). For a 
more refined analysis of the contribution of subsidies to profits, see Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Morduch (2009). 
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Microfinance has been most successful, in the business sense of expanding opera-
tions, in the domain of credit—but not only there. As for deposit-taking, the data 
are too spotty to plot trends reliably, but figures for a recent year suggest that 
many mature microfinance institutions are taking savings on a large scale. (See 
Table 1, a top-20 list of savings-takers in 2009, the last year with relatively com-
plete data.) Bank Rakyat Indonesia looms over all, with more than 21 million ac-
counts. The Bangladeshi big three (Grameen Bank, BRAC, and ASA) also cluster 
near the top. After them come institutions from elsewhere in South Asia, Latin  
Table 1. Number of Voluntary Savings Accounts, Twenty Largest Account Providers, 2009 
(most recent year with relatively complete data) 
Name Country Accounts (thousands) 
BRI Indonesia 21,229 
Grameen Bank Bangladesh 79,701 
BRAC Bangladesh 5,447 
Equity Bank Kenya 4,038 
Caja Popular Mexicana Mexico 3,514 
Khan Bank Mongolia 2,500 
ASA Bangladesh 1,324 
Capitec Bank South Africa 12,972 
UNACOOPEC Cote d’Ivoire 925 
Crediscotia Peru 8,081 
BURO Bangladesh 747 
FECECAM Benin 708 
RCPB Burkina Faso 673 
ACSI Ethiopia 612 
CMS Senegal 607 
ACLEDA Cambodia 586 
PRODEM Bolivia 568 
WDB Sri Lanka 555 
BancoEstado Chile 504 
Sabaragamuwa Sri Lanka 448 
Notes: 1Includes an unknown number of involuntary accounts, required as part of borrowing. 2Number of de-
positors rather than accounts. Excludes the Banco Caja Social Colombia and the Kenya Post Office Savings 
Bank as institutions that do not emphasize financial self-sufficiency. 
Source: MIX 
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America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. These include PRODEM in Bolivia, which 
along with its urban cousin BancoSol (the two descend from the same non-profit), 
holds nearly 1.2 million savings accounts (MIX 2012)—that in a nation of 10 mil-
lion people and perhaps 2 million households. 
The microfinance movement has achieved notable successes over the last dec-
ade with another financial service, money transfers. The leading example is M-
PESA, the extraordinarily successful phone-based system in Kenya. Run by a mo-
bile telephone operator, M-PESA is not part of the microfinance industry as usu-
ally conceived. But it is part of the historical movement, for it began as a way to 
service microloan payments electronically (Hughes and Lonie 2007). And it em-
bodies the dominant philosophy in the industry, that the best way to serve the poor 
is to operate in a businesslike, cost-covering way, in order to scale up. In its first 
five years of life, M-PESA has grown to 15 million adults. To date, it has trans-
ferred some $15 billion.6 No microfinance institution has ever grown so fast. 
In sum, while certain failings of microcredit have become clear in recent years, 
and must be reckoned with, in assessing the industry’s past and shaping its future, 
it is important to recognize its successes too. 
3 The Troubles 
Despite all these achievements, the six years since the symbolic accolade of the 
Nobel Prize have been tough on the microfinance industry. ROE on investible 
MFIs fell from +20 % at the end of 2007 to –5 % at end-2009 (Symbiotics 2012b). 
The first MIV closures occurred in 2010 and accelerated in 2011. The country 
with the most loans, India, saw a major microcredit setback; and the number-two 
country, Bangladesh, is witnessing a government take-over of its leading MFI. 
The tone of press coverage has flipped from positive to negative. Investment 
growth is slowing to the low single digits (MicroRate 2012). 
Four principal challenges have emerged: rigorous academic studies on the im-
pact of microcredit; public stock flotations that stoked controversy by arguably 
enriching a few investors and founders at the expense of the poor; coercive loan 
collection practices; and microcredit bubbles in some markets. Environmental fac-
tors also turned against the industry, including the global financial crisis and po-
litical antibodies in Nicaragua, India, and Bangladesh. But since the latter are 
complex and idiosyncratic and largely beyond the control of the industry, they will 
not be discussed in this short review.  
                                                          
6 Squad Digital (2012). 
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3.1 Randomized Impact Studies 
In 2009, the first two randomized studies of the impact of microcredit appeared. 
As discussed below, the studies’ conclusions should not be devastating for micro-
finance. But the new research, by questioning the popular perception of micro-
credit as a powerful weapon against poverty, did cause negative press. “Perhaps 
microfinance isn’t such a big deal after all,” ran a headline in the Financial Times, 
for example (Harford 2009).7 And bad press is a threat in itself. 
One of the studies looked at group credit in Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra 
Pradesh; the other, individual loans in Manila. Neither new analysis found an impact 
on average poverty, at least within 12–18 months of availability (Banerjee et al. 
2009; Karlan and Zinman 2011). “Poverty” is proxied in the studies by such indica-
tors as number of children in school and monthly per-capita household spending. 
The Hyderabad experiment, however, did reveal a stimulus to microenterprise 
starts, investment, and profits. Perhaps the profit increase did not measurably in-
crease household spending because families devoting more time to business activi-
ties earned less wages outside the home. Or perhaps such translation did occur but 
outside the study’s short timeframe. (A three-year follow-up is due out soon.) 
Table 2. Summary of results from randomized microcredit impact studies 
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Source: Banerjee et al. (2009); Karlan and Zinman (2011); Crépon et al. (2011); Attanasio 
et al. (2011); Augsburg et al. (2012). 
                                                          
7 Harford went on to tweet: “Note to all microfinance enthusiasts: I DO NOT WRITE 
MY OWN HEADLINES,” j.mp/WIHnR7.  
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Further studies in a variety of contexts—Africa, Europe, and Asia; for-profit and 
non-profit; rural and urban; individual- and group-based lending—have generally 
corroborated the findings of stimulus to microenterprise and lack of short-term 
impact on poverty. (See Table 2.) The diversity of the study settings makes it 
harder to argue that the 2009 results were anomalous. The burden of proof is now 
on those who would argue that microcredit in some form or in some contexts does 
reliably reduce poverty. 
3.2 Initial Public Offerings and Charges of “Usury” 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) of stock in MFIs have triggered larger earthquakes 
of controversy. In 2007, Mexico’s Compartamos sold some 30 % of itself to the 
public. The transaction valued the company at more than $1.5 billion (Rosenberg 
2007), a financial prize owing almost entirely to the MFI’s ability to charge poor 
women interest rates of 92–195 %/year (Roodman 2011) and thereby earn an ROA 
of 18 % and ROE of 39 %.8 While conceding that most of the capital gains went to 
the non-profit institutions that were Compartamos’s main early investors—Accíon 
International and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation—critics have 
questioned the morality of earning such high profits off the poor. Compartamos co-
founder Carlos Danel has defended the high profits as demonstrating the business 
viability of banking the poor.9 But critics asked: if this is not usury, what is?10 
The IPO of India’s SKS in 2010 scored a full point higher on the Richter scale. 
Individual investors and venture capitalists, not non-profit institutions, reaped the 
capital gains. At the peak stock price, the stakes of founder Vikram Akula and bil-
lionaire venture capitalist Vinod Khosla were estimated at $90 million each (Chen 
et al. 2010). Although microcredit costs far less in India than Mexico—SKS 
charged 25–32 % per annum (MFTransparency 2011)—SKS and other for-profit 
microlenders still came in for severe criticism for combining aggressive disburse-
ment with aggressive collection practices. 
3.3 Reports of Abusive Credit Methods 
In the months before the SKS IPO television channels in the company’s home 
state of Andhra Pradesh began broadcasting stories of women forced, by the bur-
den of microdebt, into prostitution or suicide. As in many countries, media com-
panies in India tend to sensationalize to get attention, and sometimes in order to 
advance the political agendas of their owners. And in India, microcredit is politi-
cal, because elected officials have long competed with each other to offer lower 
                                                          
8 The high number, unlike the low one, compounds the interest cost and factors in the po-
tential indirect cost of a 10 % savings requirement. Both numbers include value added tax. 
9 Interview with author, June 24, 2008. 
10 See Yunus criticism in Keith Epstein and Geri Smith, “Compartamos: From Nonprofit 
to Profit,” BusinessWeek, December 13, 2007. 
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interest rates through government-run lending programs. One of those—the Self-
Help Group (SHG) program—competes directly with microfinance. 
Despite the suspect source, the stories of abuse proved hard to completely dis-
miss. An organization that helps administer Andhra Pradesh’s SHG program com-
piled a list of 54 allegedly microcredit-linked suicides (SERP 2010). Bereaved 
family members told their stories to reporters, who captured them on video.11 Al-
legations also emerged of loan officers visiting the homes of defaulters and pub-
licly haranguing them to shame them into repaying. Suicides were evidently so 
rare among microcredit clients (a reported 54 out of millions) that the small loans 
may have prevented as many deaths as they caused, by giving a handful of cor-
nered people a way to go on; but their stories will never be told on TV. Nonethe-
less, the stories of multiple borrowing, abusive collection practices, and frenetic 
growth of microcreditors taken over by investors looking for a quick exit were all 
signs that something had indeed gone seriously wrong in Indian microcredit. That 
belief appears shared by a majority of the microfinance industry, even SKS foun-
der Vikram Akula (Hanna 2012).  
What then do the suicides signify for microfinance? The combination of easy 
offers of credit and tough demands for repayment, enforced through public embar-
rassment of group meetings, probably put many Indians in a tough spot—perhaps 
only the minority of all borrowers, but far more than 54. The likely difficulties of 
this larger but less well-defined group cannot be dismissed as regrettable rarities. 
3.4 Bubble Troubles 
The boom and bust in Andhra Pradesh did not follow the storyline of a classic bub-
ble—one that implodes under its own weight—because the crash was brought about 
by sudden government action. Nevertheless, growth that in retrospect appears dan-
gerously rapid, on the order of 100 % per year, is an important element of the story. 
And Andhra Pradesh is not unique in this respect. Experts at CGAP documented and 
analyzed similar reversals in 2008–09 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, Nica-
ragua, and the Punjab region of Pakistan (Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010). Each 
case is distinctive in certain respects. Politics was a major factor in Nicargua, for ex-
ample, as President Daniel Ortega endorsed the no pago movement. Ripples from 
the global financial crisis also may have hurt repayment rates. Yet the authors 
judged these three common threads to be primary: 
1. Concentrated market competition and multiple borrowing. 
2. Overstretched MFI systems and controls. 
3. Erosion of MFI lending discipline. 
                                                          
11 See for example “India’s Microcredit Meltdown,” Assignment, BBC, January 29, 2011, 
bbc.in/l6H2tI; and Tom Heinemann, “The Micro Debt,” 2010, j.mp/UCwUE9. 
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The three can be further distilled as: an imbalance between the rate of expansion 
of the quantity of lending and the capacity of the systems needed to assure the 
quality of lending. With the partial exception of Morocco, socially motivated for-
eign investors, public and private, fueled the rapid growth (Roodman 2012, p. 
278). They therefore bear some responsibility for these failures. 
4 Does Microfinance Work?  
Recent events raise fundamental questions about the efficacy of microfinance. But 
the best answers to the questions cannot be reached merely by reacting piecemeal 
to the pinpricks and body blows. We must think systematically. What constitutes 
success in microfinance? That is, when we ask whether microfinance works, what 
does “work” mean? Given a definition, or definitions, of “works,” what evidence 
is available on whether success is being achieved? Is the evidence of high quality? 
How safely can one generalize from it? What do the answers to these questions 
imply for an overall assessment of microfinance, and for strategy going forward? 
Roodman (2012) discerns three distinct conceptions of success in microfinance. 
Each corresponds, at least in English, to a different definition of “development”; 
and each tends to lead one to different kinds of evidence for testing. 
4.1 Escape from Poverty 
The first conception of success is “development as escape from poverty.” This 
corresponds to the widespread perception that microfinance, microcredit in par-
ticular, helps people out of poverty. That perception owes to stories of women tak-
ing loans to raise goats or sew saris, gain independence from husbands, and better 
their lives and their children’s lives. The perception was importantly bolstered by 
academic research seeming to show that microcredit reduces poverty. 
However, recent studies have significantly shifted our understanding of the im-
pacts of microcredit. The new generation of work is randomized, just like the best 
drug trials. For lack of randomization, the older studies could not as credibly rule 
out such statistical problems as reverse causation. That is: if people who use mi-
crocredit are better off, perhaps that is not because the microcredit helped them 
but because being more affluent made them more able to borrow. And replication 
of some leading studies of the old generation shows that methodological sophisti-
cation meant to attack problems such as reverse causality mostly obscured them 
(Roodman and Morduch 2011). 
As Table 2 showed, five randomized trials of microcredit have been released. 
They are reasonably consistent in showing that microcredit does stimulate micro-
enterprise, as measured by business starts, investment, and profits. But as men-
tioned before, they are equally consistent in finding no impact on poverty. In this 
respect, the literature has confirmed Peter Rossi’s (1987) Stainless Steel Law of 
Evaluation, which distilled his decades of experience evaluating programs: “The 
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better designed the impact assessment of a social program, the more likely is the 
resulting estimate of net impact to be zero.” Worse studies tend to show bigger 
impacts and better studies smaller impacts.  
Randomized studies of microsavings have produced more positive results. 
Among vendors in a Kenyan market town and a group of tobacco farmers in Ma-
lawi, the availability of a formal deposit account has increased investment and 
household income over 12 months (Dupas and Robinson 2009; Brune et al. 2010). 
It is worth bearing in mind that each of these studies examines just a small dot 
on the microfinance landscape—a particular product offered at a particular time in 
a particular place to a particular population, tracked for one to two years. The 
studies cannot prove that microcredit has never reduced poverty anywhere, nor 
that microsavings is always better in this respect.  
That said, decisions that must be made today should be made based on conser-
vative generalizations from the best evidence available today. And the best evi-
dence available today says that microcredit cannot be relied up on to cause devel-
opment-as-escape-from-poverty. 
4.2 Freedom 
The second conception of success borrows from the work of Amartya Sen, author 
of Development as Freedom (1999). For Sen, the essence of development is not 
just economic growth. It is expanding agency in one’s life, control over one’s cir-
cumstances. Such freedom flows from many sources: income, assets, education, 
health, civil rights, political rights. Central to Sen’s theory is the observation that 
freedoms tend to support one another. Education leads to more income, which 
leads to more education. At the macro level, he has famously argued that in India 
freedom of the press prevented famine (freedom from want) in the 1960s, whereas 
in China lack of political freedom facilitated the 30 million deaths of the Great 
Leap Forward. Freedoms are thus both ends and means. 
Financial services for the poor are inherently empowering. They are for helping 
poor people manage their money, which is central to economic survival. No work 
makes this clearer than Portfolios of the Poor (Collins et al. 2009). Through stories 
and data from detailed financial diaries, the book illustrates how those who “live on 
$2 a day” don’t live on $2 a day, but on $3 one day, 50 cents the next, $3 the day 
after, and so on. The volatility and unpredictability of income, along with the greater 
vulnerability to health emergencies, means that poor people need financial services 
more than the rich, in order to set aside money in good times and draw it out in bad. 
Informally, out of necessity, they develop credit, savings, insurance, and transfer 
services to meet this core need. Forms of microfinance are additional options, with 
disadvantages (rigidity) and advantages (reliability, impersonality). 
But inherently does not mean automatically. Credit can entrap. As a result, 
when and how much various kinds of microfinance empower or disempower is an 
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empirical question. This question about impacts is hard to answer, for the reasons 
given earlier. 
One kind of research relevant here is qualitative work, done by anthropologists 
who immerse themselves for a month or a year in communities where microfi-
nance is offered, closely following the lives of some of those affected. The 
strength of such work is the rich insight it can give into the lives of human beings, 
which is particularly helpful when studying a subtle and complex concept such as 
“empowerment.” The disadvantages are that the samples are small, usually in the 
dozens; and it is rarely experimental, thus lacking the capacity of randomized tri-
als to reliably identify causality. 
The qualitative findings on empowerment and microcredit are mixed, with the 
most negative results emerging for group loans. Helen Todd (1996) tells of a 
woman in Bangladesh labelled Begum who, along with her husband, invested her 
Grameen loans in cows and fertilizer, and climbed up a rung on the income ladder. 
And surely there have been women for whom it was a breakthrough to do serious 
financial business in public. But there are also worrying stories. Karim (2008) de-
scribes a “house-breaking” in Bangladesh in which a peer group carted off the be-
longings of a defaulting woman in order to repay her loan. Individual loans, which 
are free of the yoke of joint liability, appear more empowering (Kabeer 2001). 
Savings appears rather differently from credit in the development-as-freedom 
light. It is harder to get in trouble by saving too much than by borrowing too 
much—unless the savings institution becomes insolvent. As an empirical matter, 
deposit-takers within the mainstream microfinance movement have so far lived up 
to the trust placed in them. If anything, the responsibility of holding deposits has 
led MFIs to lend more conservatively. Fear of unleashing a bank run may also de-
ter politicians from interfering in operations (Chen 2011). Were a major deposit-
taking MFI to go under, and were savers not kept whole, the empirical picture 
would change radically. 
4.3 Industry Building 
It is interesting to note that for savings to empower, they must be safe—and that 
requires high-quality institutions, specifically, some combination of sound banks 
and effective supervisors. This brings us to the last conception of success in mi-
crofinance, “development as industry building.” Though overshadowed in the 
public imagination by the other two conceptions, it was fully articulated early in 
the movement (von Pischke 1991; Otero and Rhyne 1994; Krahnen and Schmidt 
1994). Within economics, it resonates with the thinking of Austrian economist Jo-
seph Schumpeter. Writing 100 years ago, Schumpeter (1934 [1911]) reacted 
against the supply-and-demand graphs made famous by Alfred Marshall, which 
explained how prices helped the economy find equilibrium. Schumpeter wanted to 
understand why the economy he lived in operated in disequilibrium as a steady 
stream of new firms and technologies perpetually disrupted the status quo. For 
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Schumpeter the essence of development lay in this “creative destruction.” Indeed, 
the constant churning of industrialization is what has reduced poverty in Europe 
over the last two centuries and in China over the last three decades. 
Microfinance has not turned many clients into heroes of creative destruction. 
Typically, they sell more tomatoes or raise more goats. However, the microfinance 
movement has built impressive institutions and industries in many countries. BRI 
in Indonesia; the Grameen Bank, BRAC, and ASA in Bangladesh; Pro Mujer in 
Peru; Bancosol in Bolivia; D-MIRO in Ecuador; Equity Bank in Kenya. These and 
others do something once thought impossible: they employ thousands, they serve 
millions, they compete, and as result they innovate, offering more flexible and di-
verse services at lower prices. If the randomized studies were showing microcredit 
to be the financial equivalent of cigarettes, we would not celebrate this flourish-
ing; but the case is otherwise.  
And while the contributions to development may not be significant mac-
roeconomically, they are respectable against the checkered history of foreign aid 
and philanthropy, in which failure is common. The public and private donors who 
supported the creation of the BRI program, the Grameen Bank, Bancosol, and oth-
ers, made real contributions to development. 
But not all growth of microfinance has been worthy of the label “development.” 
Sometimes creative destruction has been more destructive than creative. Examples 
include the apparent microcredit overshoots in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, and parts of India and Pakistan, all of which burst within the last four 
years (Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille 2010). 
5 Interpreting the Past and Present 
5.1 A Realistic Vision of Success 
This systematic review of the impact of microfinance according to different defi-
nitions of success is rather like a guidance counselor perusing a student’s report 
card. It is not a conclusion, but an input to a comprehensive assessment that can 
help make sense of current difficulties and plot a path forward. 
In light of this evidence, what strategies should those wanting to support finan-
cial services to the poor adopt? Just as one might engage a tutor for a student 
struggling to read, one logical response is to zero in on the weaknesses of microfi-
nance, such as the inherent but dangerous tendency to press for near-perfect re-
payment rates. The Smart Campaign is one effort of this type. It has obtained hun-
dreds of endorsements for a definition of responsible lending and is now piloting 
an audit system for compliance. Someday investors could condition their funding 
on such audits. 
However, the more mature the student, the more important it becomes to rec-
ognize that her nature is to some degree fixed, and to cultivate her manifest 
strengths. Microfinance is a mature enough industry that the latter metaphor is apt. 
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We are most likely to do good if we help the industry play to its strengths, to guide 
it along its natural grain. And the evidence suggests that its strength is not in sys-
tematically lifting people out of poverty, but building dynamic institutions to 
mass-produce inherently useful services for the poor. 
To discern this aptitude is not to imply that microfinance has always succeeded 
at what it does best. But it has done so often, and can do so more. 
This conclusion sides with the “institutionalist” school associated with promi-
nent German thinkers (J.D. von Pischke (1991); Jan Pieter Krahnen and Reinhardt 
Schmidt (1994); the work of C.P. Zeitinger and the ProCredit group), with the 
Ohio School (Dale Adams, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, and again J.D. von Pischke), 
and with Acción International (e.g., Otero and Rhyne 1994). It implies that donors 
and social investors involved in microfinance should prioritize building financially 
self-sufficient institutions and stable industries. Subject to the constraint of finan-
cial self-sufficiency, they should support the delivery of financial services charac-
terized by safety, diversity, flexibility, transparency, and prices appropriate to vul-
nerable people. Updating the philosophy, they should look to digital technologies 
in the hope that these will loosen the strictures of that binding constraint of self-
sufficiency, allowing institutions to provide more diverse, safe, and flexible ser-
vices at lower cost than once possible. 
5.2 An Anchored Perspective on Recent Difficulties 
This perspective anchors an analysis of most of the recent difficulties in microfi-
nance. 
It accepts the failure of the latest studies to demonstrate that microcredit re-
duces (or increases) poverty; it responds by observing that financial services, in-
cluding credit, are inherently useful and that economic development has always 
involved the construction of institutions to deliver such services, however imper-
fect, on a large scale. 
And it is dismayed, but not crushed, by the recent credit overshoots and reports 
of irresponsible lending practices. Much more than the impact studies, these sig-
nify serious flaws—direct challenges to the claimed core strength of microfinance 
in building institutions. However, to give up on microfinance at this point would 
be like giving up on mortgages because of the mortgage crises. Not only would it 
frustrate the continuing demand for microfinance, it would ignore and destroy the 
institutions that have been delivering it year in and year out, proving that safe, du-
rable, large scale microfinance is possible.  
As usual in credit crises, rapid growth appears to have been a core problem. 
This raises the question of what constitutes appropriate growth in microfinance. 
When is expansion healthy like the growth of a child and when is it unhealthy like 
cancer? A comparison between economy and ecology offers a way to think about 
this question (Roodman 2012). Asking when the arrival or growth of a microfi-
nance institution enriches the economic fabric is like asking when the arrival of a 
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new species adds resilience and productivity to an ecosystem. Answers to the eco-
logical question arguably include: when the new species interconnects with other 
species in diverse ways, such as through predation, competition, and symbiosis; and 
when, as a result, the species’ drive for growth is roughly counterbalanced by limits. 
Likewise, microfinance growth is most likely to enrich the economic fabric when 
MFIs link to many other economic actors—clients, regulators, domestic and foreign 
investors—and in many ways, including various forms of investment and financial 
service. Notably, relative to the common operating model that focuses on borrow-
ing abroad and lending locally, a move into deposit-taking diversifies in two ways 
at once, connecting to a new source of capital and enriching service offerings. 
The ecological analogy also suggests the value of broadening our concerns 
from the function of institutions to the functioning of industries. A financial sys-
tem is more likely to be stable when it contains diverse and interacting players. In 
addition to the financial institutions, there generally must be an enabling regula-
tory environment, credit bureaus, consumer protections, supervisors that monitor 
capital adequacy and lending propriety, investors, rule of law (requiring accessible 
courts and police), perhaps deposit insurance, and more. In the ideal, and in prac-
tice, the exact configuration of a financial system will vary by context. Regardless, 
a lesson of history is that a sustainable system must consist of more than retail 
service institutions. 
Ergo a sustainable microfinancial system, one that extends formal financial ac-
cess to poorer people, must consist of more than MFIs. Historically, financial sys-
tems have typically begun with retail institutions; then, through bitter experience, 
governments and industry actors have added components such as credit bureaus 
and deposit insurance. Microfinance appears to be no exception to this pattern of 
often learning the hard way. But in some cases, donors and social investors can 
help governments learn from the past mistakes of others—instituting deposit in-
surance before a local bank run makes the need tragically obvious—or at least 
help governments learn faster once a crisis occurs. 
5.3 The Lessons of Recent Troubles 
A natural first step in trying to learn from a financial crisis is identifying what 
caused it. As we have seen in the financial crises in wealthy nations, the search for 
the cause is inherently muddled, and for two reasons. 
First, the focus on causes ignored the question of agency. Suppose it was de-
termined that sunspots contributed to the mortgage meltdowns in Ireland and 
Spain. Blaming sunspots would not help. Better to blame the parts of the system 
that humans control for not being robust to sunspots. That is a fanciful example, so 
replace sunspots with human greed, which is also a fact of nature. Arguably, it 
does not do us much good to blame the mortgage bubbles (or the Andhra Pradesh 
overshoot) on the greed of investors. More practical is to blame the bubbles on 
rules that did not fully take into account the consequences of inevitably greedy 
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behavior. Now, the distinction between greed and rules to contain it is simplistic. 
After all, the rules are also made by self-interested people such as politicians. Still, 
politicians, regulators, donors, and social investors do often act in the public interest, 
so it is on them that our best hopes rest for agency in the public interest. Thus, as a 
practical matter, the search for causes converges to a focus on what these legislators 
and regulators should do differently next time, taking human greed as given. 
The second factor muddling the search for a cause is that causes interact. The 
global financial crisis hit many countries, with diverse regulatory systems, so it is 
not credible to blame it purely on idiosyncratic national factors as Alan Greenspan 
and the Greek government’s affinity for side deals with Goldman Sachs. Seem-
ingly, the universal cause was the huge swell of capital, much of it from certain 
developing countries. On the other hand, thanks to regulations that made Canadian 
banking relatively boring and safe—in particular, inhibiting loan securitizations—
Canada escaped major damage, even though it was tied to the same global capital 
markets (Atlantic Council and Thomson Reuters 2012). So, arguably, poor poli-
cies in the United States and Greece were the root cause after all. How to square 
this circle? At the risk of oversimplifying, the crises can be seen as arising from 
the combination of easy money and bad policies. If either had been eliminated, the 
crises would have been prevented. Thus we could blame—and adopt policies to 
redress—either factor alone and be partly right. But ideally, those seeking to act in 
the public interest would recognize both factors, survey possible policy changes 
that could affect either, then choose from among them in light of what is known 
about costs, effectiveness, and political and administrative constraints. The upshot 
is that it is important to distinguish the search for who or what to blame from the 
search for practical steps to prevent a repeat. 
In the sweep of history, countries that are wealthy today have had the most time 
to learn hard lessons (and sometimes forget them). In these nations, the lending 
system includes such actors as retail lenders; investors therein; credit information 
bureaus; and regulatory bodies that limit and monitor aspects of credit products 
such as term, term disclosure, even pricing. For institutions that take deposits, ad-
ditional regulators come knocking—to insure those deposits or ensure that under 
ordinary circumstances capital is on hand to absorb losses and meet withdrawal 
demands. 
A truth often overlooked in excitement about microfinance as a retail service 
model is that it is no exception to this need for companion institutions. If anything, 
the need is greater when targeting the poor. The Economist Intelligence Unit an-
nually surveys experts in order to assess the business environment for microfi-
nance in dozens of countries. Implied in this work is a broad agenda for building 
microfinancial ecosystems. In contrast with the more famous Doing Business in-
dex, the Global Microscope survey puts roughly equal weight on the need for legal 
space to do operate—the need to avoid prohibitively burdensome regulation—and 
the need for well-functioning institutions of restraint (EIU 2012). The compilers of 
the Microscope cull data from relevant legal texts, scholarly articles, interviews 
with country experts, and other sources. On this basis, they make qualitative  
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Peru 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 3
Bolivia 3 2 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 2
Pakistan 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 3
Philippines 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 2
Kenya 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 1 4
El Salvador 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 1
Colombia 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
Cambodia 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 0 2 1
Mexico 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 1
Panama 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 1
Ecuador 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 4 1
Paraguay 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
Chile 3 1 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 2
Uganda 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1
Ghana 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 3
Brazil 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Rwanda 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
Armenia 2 2 0 0 3 3 4 2 3 1
Tanzania 3 1 4 2 2 3 1 1 0 2
Honduras 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
Dominican Republic 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 1 3 1
India 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 0 3 2
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1 2 2 0 2 3 4 2 3 0
Indonesia 3 1 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 2
Uruguay 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 1
Mongolia 3 2 1 3 3 1 2 1 0 2
Mozambique 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Nicaragua 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 1
Nigeria 3 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
Kyrgyz Republic 3 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 2 0
Guatemala 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 2 1
Costa Rica 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 0
Azerbaijan 3 3 0 2 1 3 1 0 2 1
Tajikistan 3 3 0 2 2 3 2 0 0 0
Madagascar 3 3 0 3 2 2 0 0 1 1
China 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 0 1 0
Senegal 2 2 0 3 2 2 1 1 0 1
Georgia 3 3 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 0
Morocco 2 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 1
Lebanon 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 0 1
Bangladesh 2 2 2 1 1 2 3 0 0 1
Cameroon 3 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 0 1
Jamaica 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
Nepal 2 3 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 2
Yemen 2 3 2 1 1 2 0 0 1 1
Haiti 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1
Argentina 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 0
Dem. Rep. of Congo 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1
Sri Lanka 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
Egypt 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 1
Turkey 2 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0
Thailand 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 1 1
Venezuela 1 1 0 1 1 3 2 1 0 1
Trinidad & Tobago 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 3 0
Vietnam 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 0 0
Average 2,4 2,0 1,7 1,7 1,7 2,2 1,8 1,3 1,6 1,2
Regulatory framework for Supporting institutions for
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judgments, for example assigning a 0 if “regulated institutions may not take de-
posits,” a 1 if “Regulated institutions can take deposits, but are limited in the types 
they may accept and most regulations are burdensome,” a 2 if “regulated institu-
tions may take a reasonably broad range of deposits and regulation is only moder-
ately burdensome,” and so on up to 4. 
The results for 55 countries in 2012 show the potential for excellence—the ma-
ture markets of Peru and Bolivia top the list—and room for improvement in many 
countries. The 55 average above 2 on the 4-point scale only in connection with 
regulation and supervision of microcredit portfolios and institutional support for 
accounting transparency. (See Table 3.) Eleven countries lost ground in the 2012 
survey but 28 gained, lifting the global average overall. The biggest improvements 
were in setting up functioning credit bureaus and in permitting agents to retail fi-
nancial transactions, notably in “mobile money.”Despite the progress, the global 
capacity to regulate retail microfinance institutions lags the capacity to build and 
invest in such institutions. Indeed the microfinance investment vehicles and secu-
ritization deals are world-class. The result is microfinance ecosystems in many 
countries with robust, energetic MFIs, and few other constituents nearly so vital: 
lots of growth drive and little countervailing force. This imbalance is worrisome 
given finance’s especial propensity for instability. It makes microfinance indus-
tries fragile and potentially destructive to others and themselves. 
The imbalance arises in part from the historical tendency of microfinance pro-
moters to focus on supporting institutions and, starting in the mid-1990s, ways to 
invest in them.12 The tendency was understandable, even necessary, for several 
reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s donors lent billions to developing-country gov-
ernments for credit programs and mostly met with failure as local political econ-
omy distorted who received the subsidized credit. The microfinance movement 
arose in part as a reaction against this top-down, government-centered approach. It 
favored an adaptive, bottom-up strategy of experimenting and replicating success. 
It operated in the grey zone between the formal and informal economies, taking 
the relative lack of regulatory infrastructure as given. It accepted that countries 
that still have far to go in economic development also have far to go in institu-
tional development. It discovered that it was easier for outsiders to stand up non-
governmental lending institutions than to install functioning credit bureaus, regu-
lators, and supervisors. And it made extraordinary progress, reaching tens or hun-
dreds of millions of people. 
Still the imbalance is there, and must be reckoned with. True to the earlier 
warnings about the difficulty of isolating causes, it is not useful to simply blame 
the recent excesses in microcredit on the imbalance. None of us is a god who can 
reach down and directly adjust the balance. Nevertheless, viewing the industry as 
out of kilter in this way helps to organize the search for practical improvements. It 
points up the value of three practical steps: 
                                                          
12 The focus has not been exclusive. CGAP and some donors have also partnered with 
governments to improve the regulatory environment for microfinance. 
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1. Wherever possible, support the development of a richer institutional envi-
ronment for microfinance. Channels include traditional “North-South” 
technical assistance and “South-South” learning activities such as those run 
by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion.13 Codified principles of financial 
inclusion (Claessens, Honohan, and Rojas-Suarez 2009; G20 2010) and 
distillations of best practices (Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg 2003) can 
guide the work. 
2. Recognizing that progress on the first item will be slow, attempt to com-
pensate in domains where outsiders have more control, notably in the gov-
ernance of MFIs and the functioning of the international microfinance in-
vestment industry. The more impoverished the microfinance ecosystem, the 
less that MFIs and their investors can depend on other institutions to check 
their worst collective tendencies. The Smart Campaign, which seeks to de-
fine and monitor responsible lending, can be seen in this light. If responsi-
ble lending can be credibly measured, then funders can factor it into their 
allocations of capital. 
In addition, as Krahnen and Schmidt (1994, p. 108) argue, MFIs that 
seek the “double bottom line” would do well to institutionalize this pursuit 
by infusing their governance with pluralism. In particular, they can give 
representatives of each bottom line a strong voice on the governing board. 
Advocates for the social bottom line might be drawn from the NGOs out of 
which for-profit MFIs spring (in cases of transformation) or from relevant 
public agencies, foreign or domestic, or from social investors. Elisabeth 
Rhyne (2010) has noted that many transformations of MFIs from non-profit 
to for-profits status have given the founding NGOs ownership and board 
voice in their for-profit offspring. Indian law, however, prevented this from 
happening in Andhra Pradesh, handing control of for-profit MFIs to equity 
investors looking for a quick, lucrative exit. 
3. Confront the problem of rapid growth more systematically. Since the regu-
latory environment for microfinance in most countries resembles the 
American more than the Canadian mortgage lending environment—fragile 
to large influxes of capital—donors and social investors need to attack the 
collective action problem of modulating the quantity and character of capi-
tal inflow according to market conditions. Otherwise, investment in micro-
finance will often prove counterproductive from the point of view of indus-
try building. Just look at Spandana in India, which is hanging on by a 
thread, or Zakoura in Morocco, which had to be merged into another 
lender, or BANEX in Nicaragua, which went bankrupt. The issue here is 
primarily one of magnitudes of inflows; however, it should be recognized 
that the quality matters too. For example, an equity investment made to 
                                                          
13 Perhaps countries such as Greece and the United States could benefit from some North-
North or South-North learning. 
36 David Roodman 
give an institution adequate capital to take savings may, by enabling de-
posit-taking, make the institution lend more conservately. Equity that al-
lows a credit-only MFI to leverage more debt may have the opposite effect. 
In my experience, many people in investing institutions recognize that too 
much money of certain kinds has gone into some markets too fast. But be-
yond this, the only point of consensus among investors is that it was some 
other investor’s fault. 
Roodman (2012) proposes the creation of a kind of international credit bureau 
whose subjects would be microfinance institutions. It could monitor debt levels of 
individual MFIs, as well as their rates of growth in borrowing, lending, and equity. 
In could also monitor market conditions in countries and region where the MFIs 
operated, since rapid market growth can damage even slow-growing MFIs in that 
market. Just like an ordinary credit bureau, this one would need to be supplied 
with accurate, timely information on all MFI investment deals, whether involving 
foreign or domestic investors. Vital too would be data on portfolio quality. The 
credit bureau would need the right to share this data with potential investors. 
Based on this information, it could issue “credit scores” or red, yellow, or green 
lights to investors considering whether to place funds in various MFIs and coun-
tries. In issuing guidance, it could distinguish between deposit-taking and non-
deposit-taking ones since the former sometimes need equity investment to increase 
their capital adequacy to protect depositors, as distinct from leveraging equity for 
more lending growth. Unlike an ordinary credit bureau, it might also take the ini-
tiative in publicizing its market assessments to make them harder to ignore. Public 
investors, for example, might face pressure from politicians and taxpayers to ex-
plain why they were investing in red-light countries. 
The proposal is not without problems. The body’s hypothetical mandate begs 
many questions about how to determine when a market is at risk of overheating. 
The body’s recommendations would not be binding. And it could even backfire in 
the manner of the ratings agencies in the United States: at times it would err on the 
liberal side, creating a misplaced sense of security about some markets, boosting 
investment flows, and making matters worse than if it did not exist. That argues 
for keeping the mechanism relatively informal, so that its judgments are not taken 
as gospel. 
The practical question is not whether system would work perfectly, nor even 
whether it would improve on the status quo (which, seemingly, would not be 
hard), but whether it is worth trying. The initial funding, which would be modest 
next to the billions invested in microfinance each year, could come from founda-
tions and donors working on financial services for the poor. If successful, the MFI 
credit bureau might eventually self-finance through fees to investors or, like a rat-
ing agency, MFIs. 
Absent credible mechanisms to moderate capital flows, donors and social in-
vestors will almost certainly do best by erring on the side of providing less fund-
ing. This is because the tendency toward instability in credit markets is nonlinear. 
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Up to some unknown threshold, the economic value of a credit portfolio—the net 
present value of actual future payments—remains close to the book value. Beyond 
this threshold, credit goes increasingly into unsustainable uses, including, cru-
cially, the refinancing of older loans. This refinancing inserts a temporary wedge 
between apparent and actual credit portfolio quality. It delays the transmission of 
information about the true state of the portfolio. That facilitates further and ulti-
mately destabilizing growth.  
Not only will a ratcheting-down of microfinance investment raise the probabil-
ity that microcredit will grow sustainably. It will also increase the incentive for 
MFIs to take savings as an alternative source of funds, or to seek regulatory per-
mission to do so.  
6 Conclusion 
Microfinance has been growing for 35 years and now reaches upwards of 100 mil-
lion people, who cannot all be wrong in their judgments about the utility of micro-
finance. Moreover, most of them are served by institutions that are nearly or com-
pletely self-sufficient in financial terms; these MFIs do not depend greatly on out-
side subsidies, and so their fates do not ride on the latest headlines in the New 
York Times or Die Welt. Thus all the recent bad press will probably not extinguish 
the microfinance industry. And just as recent crises in the mainstream financial 
system do not spell Armageddon for that system, the recent wounds to the micro-
finance industry—the bubbles and political backlashes—are unlikely to bring 
down the global microfinance industry. 
Nor should they. Because of the vicissitudes of poverty, poor people need fi-
nancial services more than the rich. Their financial options will always be infe-
rior—that’s part of being poor—and microfinance offers additional options with 
distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The microfinance industry has demonstrated 
an ability to build enduring institutions to deliver a variety of inherently useful 
services on a large scale. 
Nevertheless, the recent travails are signs that something is wrong in the indus-
try. What is wrong is, ironically, what was once so right about the industry: it 
largely bypassed governments in favor of an experimental, bottom-up approach to 
institution building. The industry got so good at building institutions and injecting 
funds into them that it often forgot that a durable financial system consists of more 
than retail institutions and their investors. The narrow focus became a widening 
problem as microfinance grew. The result in some countries is a microfinancial 
ecosystem that lacks diversity, being dominated by vigorous retail MFIs subject to 
inadequate external (and, in some cases, internal) controls. 
To mature, the industry and its supporters should recognize the imbalance it has 
created. Where possible, they should work to strengthen institutions of moderation 
such as credit bureaus and regulators. Accepting that such institutions will often 
be weak, they should err on the side of investing less. In microfinance funding, 
less is sometimes more. 
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